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Abstract
We study probabilistic single-item second-price
auctions where the item is characterized by a set
of attributes. The auctioneer knows the actual in-
stantiation of all the attributes, but he may choose
to reveal only a subset of these attributes to the
bidders. Our model is an abstraction of the fol-
lowing Ad auction scenario. The website (auc-
tioneer) knows the demographic information of its
impressions, and this information is in terms of a
list of attributes (e.g., age, gender, country of loca-
tion). The website may hide certain attributes from
its advertisers (bidders) in order to create thicker
market, which may lead to higher revenue. We
study how to hide attributes in an optimal way.
We show that it is NP-hard to solve for the op-
timal attribute hiding scheme. We then derive a
polynomial-time solvable upper bound on the op-
timal revenue. Finally, we propose two heuristic-
based attribute hiding schemes. Experiments show
that revenue achieved by these schemes is close to
the upper bound.
1 Introduction
One advantage of Internet advertising is that it offers adver-
tisers the ability to target customers based on various traits
such as demographics. [Even-Dar et al., 2007] showed that,
for sponsored search of a given keyword, instead of running a
single auction for the keyword, we can split the whole auction
into many separate auctions based on visitors/impressions’
contexts (e.g., demographics). For example, if we know and
only know the visitors’ locations, then each location defines a
context. In this example scenario, splitting based on context
means separate auction for each location. Splitting based on
context increases the advertisers’ welfare. The explanation is
simple: after splitting, advertisers can tailor their bids to the
context. As a result, advertisers generally only win (impres-
sions from) visitors that they aim to target, and the payments
are also lower, since advertisers only face competition from
those targeting similar visitors. On the other hand, splitting
may reduce the revenue received by the auctioneer (publisher,
e.g., website) due to the thin market problem: there may be
few competitors for some contexts. Actually, if for every con-
text, there is only one advertiser interested in it, then the total
revenue is 0 under the standard second-price auction.
[Ghosh et al., 2007] observed that having a single auction
for all contexts and having separate auction for each con-
text are not the only two options. There are other ways to
split based on context, and it may lead to much higher rev-
enue. The idea explored in [Ghosh et al., 2007] is to cluster
the contexts into bundles, and run separate auction for each
bundle. For example, suppose there are three different con-
texts: Beijing, Chicago, and London (assuming the only con-
textual information is the location and visitors are only from
these three cities). We can have one auction for the bundle
Beijing and Chicago (and a second auction for London only).
The interpretation (due to [Emek et al., 2012]) is that if a vis-
itor is from Beijing or Chicago, then the auctioneer informs
the advertisers that the impression is from one of these two
cities, but not exactly which. When this happens, both ad-
vertisers targeting Beijing and advertisers targeting Chicago
will compete in the auction. Their bids depend on how much
they value impressions from Beijing and Chicago, respec-
tively. Their bids also depend on the conditional probability
that the impression is from Beijing (or Chicago) given that
the impression is from one of these two cities.
To put it more formally, [Ghosh et al., 2007] studied prob-
abilistic single-item second-price auctions (again, interpreta-
tion due to [Emek et al., 2012]). In such an auction, there
is only one item for sale under a second-price auction, but
the item has different possible instantiations. The auc-
tioneer knows the actual instantiation but the bidders do
not. The auctioneer may choose to hide certain information
from the bidders if this increases the revenue. The prob-
abilistic single-item second-price auction model is an ab-
straction of the following Ad auction scenario. We have a
website that sells one advertisement slot. That is, there is
only one item – the only advertisement slot, but the item
takes many possible instantiations, due to the fact that vis-
itors/impressions have different demographic profiles. The
auctioneer knows every visitor’s demographic profile, and
he may hide certain information from the advertisers. As
mentioned above, [Ghosh et al., 2007] considered hiding in-
formation by clustering: the auctioneer tells the bidders
that the actual instantiation is among several instantiations.
[Emek et al., 2012; Bro Miltersen and Sheffet, 2012] studied
the exact same model and went one step further. These two
papers studied hiding information by signaling: the auction-
eer sends out different signals, and the bidders infer the prob-
ability distribution of the actual instantiation, based on the
signal received. It is easy to see that signaling is more gen-
eral than clustering. Interestingly, for full information set-
tings (settings where the auctioneer knows the bidders’ ex-
act valuations), [Ghosh et al., 2007] showed that it is NP-
hard to solve for the optimal clustering scheme (optimal in
terms of revenue). On the other hand, [Emek et al., 2012;
Bro Miltersen and Sheffet, 2012] both independently showed
that, under the same full information assumption, it takes only
polynomial time to solve for the optimal signaling scheme.
This is mostly due to the fact that instantiations are treated as
divisible goods under signaling schemes,
In this paper, we continue the study of revenue-maximizing
probabilistic single-item second-price auctions. We observe
that in practice, Ad impressions are categorized based on mul-
tiple attributes. Given this, we argue that the most natural
way to hide information is by hiding attributes. For example,
let there be three attributes, each with two possible values:
• Age: Teenager, Adult
• Gender: Male, Female
• Location: US, Non-US
Together there are 23 possible instantiations. Under the
clustering scheme studied in [Ghosh et al., 2007], the web-
site is allowed to hide information by bundling any subset
of instantiations. However, not all bundles are natural. For
example, consider the bundle {(Teenager, Male, US), (Adult,
Female, Non-US)}. By creating this bundle, the website basi-
cally may tell the advertisers that a visitor is either a teenage
US male or an adult Non-US female. This does not appear
natural. The signaling scheme studied in [Emek et al., 2012;
Bro Miltersen and Sheffet, 2012] is even more general than
clustering, so it may also lead to unnatural bundles.
On the other hand, attribute hiding always leads to natural
bundles. For example, the website may hide the location at-
tribute. That is, if the actual instantiation is (Teenager, Male,
US), then the website may inform the advertisers that the vis-
itor is a teenage male. By hiding the location attribute, we es-
sentially created a bundle (Teenager, Male, ?), which consists
of both (Teenager, Male, US) and (Teenager, Male, Non-US).
Based on the above example, it is easy to see that attribute
hiding is clustering with a particular structure. It should be
noted that this relationship between attribute hiding and clus-
tering does not mean previous results on clustering apply to
our model. For example, one of the two main results from
[Ghosh et al., 2007] is a constructed clustering scheme that
guarantees one half of the optimal revenue (and one half of
the optimal social welfare). The construction does not apply
to our model since it generally leads to unnatural bundles.
In this paper, we first show that it is NP-hard to solve
for the optimal attribute hiding scheme.1 We then derive a
1We mentioned earlier that [Ghosh et al., 2007] proved a similar
result. The authors showed that it is NP-hard to solve for the optimal
clustering scheme. It should be noted that our NP-hardness result is
not implied by this earlier result, which relied on reduction involv-
polynomial-time solvable upper bound on the optimal rev-
enue. Finally, we propose two heuristic-based attribute hiding
schemes. Experiments show that revenue achieved by these
schemes is close to the upper bound.
Besides the aforementioned related work in the computer
science literature, bundling has also been well-studied in the
economics literature. [Palfrey, 1983] observed that for small
numbers of bidders, a revenue-maximizing auctioneer may
choose to bundle the items, and this makes bidders univer-
sally worse-off. On the other hand, for large numbers of
bidders, the auctioneer may choose to unbundle the items,
and this hurts the high-demand bidders while benefiting the
low-demand bidders. [Chakraborty, 1999] quantitatively an-
alyzed the bundling behavior of the auctioneer. The result is
that under a Vickrey auction, for each pair of objects, there
is a unique critical number. If there are fewer bidders than
this number, the seller chooses to bundle the items, and vice
versa. [Avery and Hendershott, 2000] studied more sophisti-
cated bundling policy, including bundling with discounts and
probabilistic bundling (the probability of bundling occurring
depends on the bids).
2 Model Description
There is a single item for sale characterized by k attributes
(attribute 1 to k). Attribute i has Ci possible values, rang-
ing from 0 to Ci − 1. m is the total number of possible in-
stantiations. m =
∏
i Ci. In this paper, when we mention
polynomial time or NP-hardness, we mean in terms of m.
An instantiation whose i-th attribute equals ai is written as
(a1, a2, a3, . . . , ak)
The space of all possible instantiations Ω is
{0, . . . , C1 − 1} × {0, . . . , C2 − 1}× . . .× {0, . . . , Ck − 1}
Definition 1. A natural bundle b is an element from the fol-
lowing set of all natural bundles (denoted by B):
{0, . . . , C1−1, ?}×{0, . . . , C2−1, ?}×. . .×{0, . . . , Ck−1, ?}
Natural bundles are bundles of instantiations resulting from
hiding attributes. An attribute of a natural bundle either
takes a specific value, or is represented by a question mark,
which means that this attribute is hidden. For example, let
k = 5, given the instantiation (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5), if we
hide attributes 1 and 3, then it results in the natural bundle
(?, a2, ?, a4, a5). This bundle has size C1C3. As another ex-
ample, every instantiation itself corresponds to a natural bun-
dle of size 1 (no attribute hidden). An instantiation ω belongs
to a natural bundle b if and only if for every attribute, either
ω and b share the same attribute value, or the attribute is hid-
den for b. Unlike the total number of arbitrary bundles, which
equals 2m, the total number of natural bundles is polynomial
in m, as shown below:
|B| =
∏
1≤i≤k
(Ci + 1) ≤
∏
1≤i≤k
C2i = m
2
ing unnatural bundles. Actually, our requirement on bundles being
natural greatly adds to the difficulty of the reduction, and our proof
is based on completely new techniques.
The probabilities’ of different instantiations are based on
a publicly known distribution ∆(Ω). To simplify the presen-
tation, when discussing bidders’ valuations, we factor in the
probabilities. For example, if bidder i values ω at 5 when ω is
the actual instantiation, and ω happens with probability 0.1,
then we say bidder i’s valuation for ω is 0.5.
Let n be the number of bidders. Let vi(ω) be
bidder i’s (expected) valuation for instantiation ω.
Following [Ghosh et al., 2007; Emek et al., 2012;
Bro Miltersen and Sheffet, 2012]2, we assume full in-
formation: the auctioneer knows the bidders’ true valuations.
Again, following previous models, we only consider bidders
with additive valuations. That is, bidder i’s valuation for
bundle b, denoted by vi(b), equals
∑
ω∈b vi(ω).
Following previous models, the auction is the Vickrey auc-
tion. We use 2(b) to denote the revenue for selling b as a bun-
dle. 2(b) is the second highest value in {vi(b)|1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Definition 2. An attribute hiding scheme is a way to cluster
the instantiations into natural bundles. An attribute hiding
scheme is characterized by a set of bundles {b1, b2, . . . , bt},
satisfying
• All bundles are natural: bi ∈ B for 1 ≤ i ≤ t
• The bundles are disjoint3: for every pair of bi and bj ,
there exists an attribute, so that for this attribute, bi and
bj take different values (neither is ?).
Under the attribute hiding scheme {b1, b2, . . . , bt}, instantia-
tions covered by bi will have their attributes hidden to match
bi. Essentially, instantiations in bi are sold in a bundle. In-
stantiations not covered by any bi are sold without hiding at-
tributes (sold separately as natural bundles of size 1).
Under attribute hiding scheme {b1, b2, . . . , bt}, the revenue
of the auctioneer equals
∑
1≤i≤t
2(bi) +
∑
ω∈Ω−∪1≤i≤tbi
2(ω)
We introduce another function r. For b ∈ B, r(b) rep-
resents the extra revenue obtained by selling b as a bundle,
rather than selling instantiations in b separately. We have
r(b) = 2(b)−
∑
ω∈b
2(ω)
The revenue of the auctioneer can then be rewritten as
∑
1≤i≤t
r(bi) +
∑
ω∈Ω
2(ω)
The second term of the above expression does not depend
on the attribute hiding scheme. Therefore, the problem of
designing optimal attribute hiding scheme is equivalent to
the problem of searching for a set of disjoint natural bundles
{b1, b2, . . . , bt}, so that
∑
1≤i≤t r(bi) is maximized.
2Besides the full information setting, [Emek et al., 2012] also
discussed the more general Bayesian setting.
3If under an attribute hiding scheme, two different natural bun-
dles share one common instantiation, then for this instantiation, it is
not clear which attributes we should hide.
3 Hardness Result
Previously, [Ghosh et al., 2007] showed that it is NP-hard
to solve for the optimal clustering scheme. The proof was
by reduction from 3-partition: given 3z integers, determine
whether it is possible to partition them into z groups with
equal sums. In this section, we prove a similar result. We
show that it is also NP-hard to solve for the optimal attribute
hiding scheme. Our proof is by reduction from monotone
one-in-three 3SAT [Schaefer, 1978]. Monotone one-in-three
3SAT is a variant of 3SAT. Monotone means that the liter-
als are just variables, never negations. One-in-three means
that the determination problem is to see whether there is an
assignment so that for each clause, exactly one literal is true.
We emphasize again that our result is not implied by the hard-
ness result from [Ghosh et al., 2007].
Theorem 1. It is NP-hard to solve for the optimal attribute
hiding scheme.
Proof. Let us consider the following monotone one-in-three
3SAT instance with D clauses:
(xf(1) ∨ xf(2) ∨ xf(3)) ∧ (xf(4) ∨ xf(5) ∨ xf(6)) ∧ . . .
. . . ∧ (xf(3D−2) ∨ xf(3D−1) ∨ xf(3D))
There are 3D literals, and they are from a list of E vari-
ables (x1 to xE , f ’s range is between 1 and E). According
to [Schaefer, 1978], it is NP-complete to determine whether
there exists an assignment of the xi, so that the 3SAT instance
is true, and for each clause, there is exactly one true literal.
We will construct a probabilistic single-item auction sce-
nario with m possible instantiations and n bidders. Both m
and n are polynomial in E. We will show that for the con-
structed scenario, if we are able to solve for the optimal at-
tribute hiding scheme in polynomial time (in m), then we
are able to determine the above 3SAT instance in polynomial
time (in E). This implies that it is NP-hard to solve for the
optimal attribute hiding scheme.
Our construction is as follows. Let the number of attributes
k be ⌈log2(D)⌉ + ⌈log2(E)⌉ + 11. All attributes are binary.
The total number of instantiations m is polynomial in E as
shown below.
m = 2⌈log2(D)⌉+⌈log2(E)⌉+11 ≤ 2log2(D)+log2(E)+13
= 8192DE ≤ 8192E4
Our proof relies on the following seven families of natural
bundles (Family 1 to 7):
(e, d, 0, ?, ?, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) (1)
(e, d, ?, 0, ?, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) (2)
(e, d, ?, ?, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) (3)
(e, ?, 0, 0, 0, ?, ?, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) (4)
(?, d, 1, ?, ?, 0, 1, ?, ?, 0, 1, 0, 1) (5)
(?, d, ?, 1, ?, 0, 1, 0, 1, ?, ?, 0, 1) (6)
(?, d, ?, ?, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, ?, ?) (7)
In the above, e is the binary representation of integer e
(1 ≤ e ≤ E). The representation’s width is ⌈log2(E)⌉. Simi-
larly, d is the binary representation of integer d (1 ≤ d ≤ D).
The representation’s width is ⌈log2(D)⌉. Finally, ? is ? re-
peated ⌈log2(E)⌉ times (Family 5, 6, and 7) or ⌈log2(D)⌉
times (Family 4).
We recall that the problem of designing optimal attribute
hiding scheme is equivalent to the search of disjoint natural
bundles {b1, b2, . . . , bt}, so that
∑
1≤i≤t r(bi) is maximized.
Given a natural bundle b, r(b) depends on the bidders’ val-
uations. We will construct a set of bidders, so that for any
natural bundle b, r(b) = 0 by default. The exceptions are:
• For i = 1, 2, 3, we use bi(e, d) to represent the nat-
ural bundle characterized by e and d in Family i.
r(bi(e, d)) = 1 if and only if, in the 3SAT instance, vari-
able e appears in the i-th position of clause d.
• We use b4(e) to represent the natural bundle character-
ized by e in Family 4. Let #e be the number of times
variable e appears in the 3SAT instance. It is without
loss of generality to assume #e ≤ D (no literal appears
twice in a clause). Let r(b4(e)) = #e(1− ǫ). Here, ǫ is
a constant that is less than 1
D
. The idea is to make sure
that #e(1− ǫ) > #e− 1.
• We use b5(d) to represent the natural bundle character-
ized by d in Family 5. r(b5(d)) = 3.
• We use b6(d) to represent the natural bundle character-
ized by d in Family 6. r(b6(d)) = 3.
• We use b7(d) to represent the natural bundle character-
ized by d in Family 7. r(b7(d)) = 3.
For now, we simply assume that it is possible to construct
a polynomial number of bidders, so that the values of r(b) for
different b are indeed as described above. We will provide the
specific construction toward the end.
Let O be an optimal attribute hiding scheme corresponding
to the above construction. If r(b) = 0, then it is without loss
of generality to assume b /∈ O. Therefore, we can ignore
bundles not in the above seven families. Some bundles from
Family 1 to 3 can also be ignored for the same reason. For
presentation purposes, we call the remaining bundles helpful
bundles. A bundle b is helpful if and only if r(b) > 0.
Let us consider a fixed variable e (1 ≤ e ≤ E). e appears
#e times in the 3SAT instance, so there are exactly #e pairs
of d (1 ≤ d ≤ D) and i (1 ≤ i ≤ 3), so that bi(e, d) is helpful.
We use be,1, be,2, . . . , be,#e to denote these #e helpful bun-
dles. They are the only helpful bundles that intersect b4(e).
If some of these bundles are not in O, then none of them is in
O. The reason is that r(b4(e)) = #e(1 − ǫ) > #e − 1, so it
is better off to add b4(e) into O (and push out be,1 to be,#e if
they are in O). In summary, for e from 1 to E, we must have
one of the following two:
• be,1, be,2, . . . , be,#e are all in O. b4(e) is not in O.
• None of be,1, be,2, . . . , be,#e is in O. b4(e) is in O.
Let T be the set of e values where be,1, be,2, . . . , be,#e
are all in O. Let F be the set of e values where none of
be,1, be,2, . . . , be,#e is in O. We use O1234 to denote the set
of helpful bundles in O that belong to Family 1 to 4. We have
∑
b∈O1234
r(b) =
∑
e∈T
#e+
∑
e∈F
#e(1− ǫ)
= ǫ
∑
e∈T
#e+
∑
e∈T
#e(1− ǫ) +
∑
e∈F
#e(1− ǫ)
= ǫ
∑
e∈T
#e+ (1− ǫ)3D
Let us then consider a fixed variable d (1 ≤ d ≤ D), b5(d),
b6(d), and b7(d) pair-wise intersect. Therefore, in O, at most
one of them can appear. Actually, exact one of them appears.
If none of them appears in O, then we can add b5(d) into O,
which results in higher revenue. Let e2 and e3 be the second
and third variables in clause d of the 3SAT instance. The
only helpful bundles b5(d) intersects with are b2(e2, d) and
b3(e3, d). By removing these two from O (if they are in O
to start with) and adding b5(d) into O, the revenue increases.
Therefore, for any d from 1 to D, O contains exactly one
of {b5(d), b6(d), b7(d)}. We use O567 to denote the set of
helpful bundles in O that belong to Family 5 to 7. We have
∑
b∈O567
r(b) = 3D
Hence,
∑
b∈O
r(b) =
∑
b∈O1234
r(b)+
∑
b∈O567
r(b) = ǫ
∑
e∈T
#e+(2−ǫ)3D
Let d be a specific value between 1 and D. If b5(d) be-
longs to O, then among helpful bundles characterized by d
from Family 1 to 3, the only helpful bundle that can coexist
with b5(d) is b1(e1, d), where e1 is the first variable in clause
d of the 3SAT instance. In general, no matter which among
{b5(d), b6(d), b7(d)} appears in O, among helpful bundles
characterized by d from Family 1 to 3, there is at most one
that can be in O. Therefore, the total number of helpful bun-
dles from Family 1 to 3 in O is at most D. we have
∑
e∈T
#e ≤ D
∑
b∈O
r(b) = ǫ
∑
e∈T
#e+(2−ǫ)3D ≤ ǫD+(2−ǫ)3D = 6D−2Dǫ
If we are able to solve for the optimal attribute hiding
scheme in polynomial time, then we are also able to deter-
mine in polynomial time whether
∑
b∈O r(b) is equal to the
upper bound 6D − 2Dǫ. If they are equal, then we have a
satisfactory assignment of the 3SAT instance. For variable e,
be,1 to be,#e determine whether e is true or not. If they are all
in O, then e is set to be true. Otherwise (if none of them is
in O), e is set to be false. When the upper bound is reached,∑
e∈T #e = D, which implies that under the above assign-
ment, there are exactlyD true literals. Next, we show that two
true literals cannot appear in the same clause. That is, there
is exactly one true literal for each clause under the assign-
ment, and all clauses are satisfied (there are D true clauses).
Given d, let the variables in clause d be e1, e2, e3. b1(e1, d),
b2(e2, d), and b3(e3, d) are all helpful bundles. We proved
that among helpful bundles characterized by d from Family 1
to 3, there is at most one that can be in O. Therefore, only
one of b1(e1, d), b2(e2, d), b3(e3, d) can be inO. That is, only
one of e1, e2, e3 is set to be true.
The other direction can be shown similarly. If there is a sat-
isfactory assignment of the 3SAT instance, then
∑
b∈O r(b)
should match the upper bound 6D − 2Dǫ.
In conclusion, for the constructed auction setting, it is NP-
hard to determine whether the optimal revenue
∑
b∈O r(b) +∑
ω∈Ω 2(ω) reaches 6D − 2Dǫ+
∑
ω∈Ω 2(ω).
Finally, we still need to show that it is possible to construct
a polynomial number of bidders, so that the values of r(b)
are exactly as described above. Due to space constraint, we
present the construction and omit the proof.
• We construct two bidders who both value every instanti-
ation equally, and the valuation for every instantiation is
L (L > D).
• For every helpful bundle b, we construct two new bid-
ders. By default, both bidders value all instantiations in
b at L and value all instantiations outside of b at 0. The
exceptions are that one bidder values instantiation b|0? at
r(b) + L and the other bidder values instantiation b|1? at
r(b) + L. Here, b|y? is the instantiation resulting from
replacing all ? in b by y.
4 Tree-Structured Attribute Hiding Schemes
In this section, we study a special family of attribute hiding
schemes, which we call the tree-structured schemes.
Let b be a non-unit natural bundle (bundle of size greater
than 1). For b, at least one attribute is hidden. Let x be one of
the hidden attributes of b. We can split b into Cx disjoint nat-
ural bundles by revealing attribute x. The resulting bundles
are b|0x, b|
1
x, . . . , b|
Cx−1
x . b|
i
x represents the natural bundle ob-
tained by replacing the x-th attribute of b by i. If b belongs to
an attribute hiding scheme O, then after splitting b, the new
scheme becomes
(O − {b}) ∪ {b|0x, b|
1
x, . . . , b|
Cx−1
x }
It is easy to see that the new scheme is still feasible (the bun-
dles remain disjoint).
Tree-structured attribute hiding schemes are results
of recursive splitting (revealing attribute) starting from
{(?, ?, . . . , ?)}. At every step, we either terminate and keep
the current scheme, or pick a non-unit bundle from the current
scheme, and split (reveal) one of its attributes.
Definition 3. An attribute hiding scheme O is tree-structured
if and only if it satisfies one of the following:
• O = {(?, ?, . . . , ?)}: the scheme is simply hiding all
attributes and selling all instantiations in a single bundle.
• There exists a tree-structured attribute hiding schemeO′.
There exists a bundle b ∈ O′ whose x-th attribute is
hidden. After splitting b by revealing attribute x, the
resulting scheme is equivalent to O.4
Let us consider an example with three binary attributes.
{(?, ?, ?)} is, by definition, a tree-structured attribute hiding
scheme. Starting from {(?, ?, ?)}, if we pick (?, ?, ?) and re-
veal its second attribute, then we get
4Two schemes are equivalent if they share the same set of non-
unit bundles.
(?, ?, ?)
(?, 0, ?) (?, 1, ?)
The leaves {(?, 0, ?), (?, 1, ?)} characterize a new tree-
structured attribute hiding scheme. If we further split the first
bundle (?, 0, ?) based on its third attribute, then we get
(?, ?, ?)
(?, 0, ?)
(?, 0, 0) (?, 0, 1)
(?, 1, ?)
Again, the leaves {(?, 0, 0), (?, 0, 1), (?, 1, ?)} characterize a
new tree-structured attribute hiding scheme.
Proposition 1. If there are at most two attributes, then all
attribute hiding schemes are tree-structured.5
Proposition 2. If there are at least three attributes, then there
exist attribute hiding schemes that are not tree-structured.
Proof. We construct the following natural bundles. For i
from 1 to k, let bi’s i-th attribute be hidden, let bi’s ((i mod
k) + 1)-th attribute be 1, and let bi’s all other attributes be 0.
b1 = (?, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0, 0)
b2 = (0, ?, 1, 0, . . . , 0, 0)
b3 = (0, 0, ?, 1, . . . , 0, 0)
. . .
bk−1 = (0, 0, 0, 0, . . . , ?, 1)
bk = (1, 0, 0, 0, . . . , 0, ?)
The bi are disjoint. {b1, b2, . . . , bk} is not tree-structured be-
cause starting from (?, ?, . . . , ?), if we ever reveal an attribute
(e.g., attribute x), then bx cannot be in the final scheme.
As we mentioned earlier, tree-structured attribute hiding
schemes are results of recursive splitting starting from the
bundle of all instantiations. At every step, we either termi-
nate or split a non-unit bundle in some way. For every natural
bundle b, let t(b) be the optimal revenue for selling instanti-
ations in b, as a result of making optimal recursive splitting
decisions on b. t((?, ?, . . . , ?)) is then the optimal revenue of
tree-structured attribute hiding schemes. Given a bundle, we
either sell it as a whole, or split it in some way as a first step.
Let h(b) be the set of hidden attributes of b. We have
t(b) = max{2(b), max
x∈h(b)
∑
0≤i≤Cx−1
t(b|ix)}
If b has size 1, then h(b) = ∅. That is, for unit bundles,
t(b) = 2(b). Given the values of t(b) for all b with |h(b)| = y,
we can then easily compute the values of t(b) for all b with
|h(b)| = y + 1. The total number of natural bundles |B|
is polynomial in m. For every b, t(b) is the maximum of
at most k + 1 values, which is at most log2m + 1. There-
fore, the optimal revenue t((?, ?, . . . , ?)) can be computed in
polynomial time. The corresponding optimal scheme can be
obtained along the way.
5This proposition implies that if there are at most two attributes
(m can still be large), then we can solve for the optimal attribute hid-
ing scheme in polynomial time, because it must be tree-structured.
5 Upper Bound and Weighted Matching
Our objective is to find a set of disjoint natural bundles, de-
noted by O, which maximizes
∑
b∈O r(b). We can model
it as an integer program. We introduce |B| binary variables.
For b ∈ B, let zb be a binary variable. If zb = 1, then it
means b ∈ O. The number of binary variables |B| is polyno-
mial in m. The objective is to maximize ∑b∈B zbr(b). The
constraints are that bundles in O are disjoint. That is, for
b1, b2 ∈ B, if b1 and b2 intersect, zb1 + zb2 ≤ 1. The number
of constraints is at most |B|2, which is polynomial in m. In
summary, the optimal revenue can be solved for based on an
integer program with polynomial numbers of variables and
constraints. One upper bound can then be solved for in poly-
nomial time if we consider the linear relaxation (replacing
binary variables by non-integer variables).
Some preprocessing can vastly reduce the number of vari-
ables in the above program. We first observe that, by defini-
tion, r(b) = 0 for all b with size 1. That is, we can safely
set zb = 0 for all b with size 1. We then observe that, for
any natural bundle b with size greater than 1, if the following
expression is true, then it means that instead of selling b as a
single bundle, we can achieve higher revenue by recursively
splitting it, in which case we can safely set zb = 0.
2(b) < max
x∈h(b)
∑
0≤i≤Cx−1
t(b|ix)
In Section 6, our simulation shows that when computing
the upper bound, the above observations indeed vastly reduce
the number of variables in the linear program. For example,
for settings with 10 binary attributes and 10 bidders, origi-
nally, there are as many as (2 + 1)10 = 59049 variables. Af-
ter preprocessing, there are only 220.28 variables on average
over repeated simulations.
We then discuss another heuristic for generating attribute
hiding schemes with high revenue. This heuristic only applies
to settings where all attributes are binary. If all attributes are
binary, then a natural bundle with only one attribute hidden
contains exactly two instantiations. The heuristic is based on
maximum weighted matching. We view all instantiations as
vertices. If two instantiations can be merged into a natural
bundle b, and r(b) > 0, then we create an edge with weight
r(b) between them. Maximum weighted matching can be
solved in polynomial time. The matching result character-
izes the optimal attribute hiding scheme under the additional
constraint that at most one attribute is hidden.6
6 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performances of the proposed
heuristic-based attribute hiding schemes. For different val-
ues of k, C¯, and n, we construct problem instances with k
attributes, each attribute taking C¯ possible values, and n bid-
ders. The total number of possible instantiations is then C¯k.
6In Section 6, our simulation shows that there are generally very
few natural bundles with at least two hidden attributes cannot be
recursively split to achieve higher revenue. This somewhat justifies
the heuristic requirement that at most one attribute is hidden.
For each instantiation, bidders’ valuations are drawn indepen-
dently fromU(0, 1). For every setup, we repeat 100 times and
report the averages.
Setup Tree Match UB #Opt #Var HM
k = n = 3
C¯ = 2 13.33 11.58 15.42 47 5.82 1.08
k = n = 5
C¯ = 2 3.953 3.810 4.354 35 15.8 1.54
k = n = 10
C¯ = 2 0.836 0.927 0.950 0 220.28 4.76
k = n = 3
C¯ = 3 9.251 NA 10.58 25 13.28 0.96
k = n = 5
C¯ = 3 1.767 NA 1.976 0 45.39 0.3
k = n = 8
C¯ = 3 0.296 NA 0.361 0 326.18 0.01
The table fields are described below:
• Tree, Match, UB: Comparing to selling all instantia-
tions separately, the extra revenue in terms of percent-
age. Tree is short for optimal tree-structured scheme.
Match is short for optimal scheme based on maximum
weighted matching (only applies to C¯ = 2). UB is short
for upper bound on the optimal revenue.
• #Opt: Among 100 repeated simulations, how many
times one of the heuristic-based schemes reaches the up-
per bound (therefore guarantees optimality7).
• #Var: How many variables are in the linear program for
computing upper bound.
• HM: How many natural bundles with at least two hidden
attributes cannot be recursively split to achieve higher
revenue.
7 Future Research
Given the fact that it is NP-hard to solve for the optimal
attribute hiding scheme, one direction of future research is
to study whether there are heuristic-based attribute hiding
schemes that guarantee a constant fraction of the optimal rev-
enue. A similar direction is to see how much revenue we
lose by not allowing unnatural bundles. A preliminary result
shows that the optimal revenue by clustering (allowing un-
natural bundles) can be as high as twice the optimal revenue
by hiding attributes. The construction is as follows. There
are m instantiations and m bidders. Bidder i only values in-
stantiation i positively. Let instantiation 1 be (0, 0, . . . , 0)
and bidder 1’s valuation for it be m2 . Let instantiation m
be (1, 1, . . . , 1) and bidder m’s valuation for it be m2 . For
1 < i < m, let bidder i’s valuation for instantiation i be 1.
With this setup, the optimal revenue by clustering is 2m−22 .
The optimal revenue by hiding attributes is m2 . The ratio
2m−2
m
approaches 2 for large m.
7Even if the heuristic-based schemes do not reach the upper
bound, they may still possibly be optimal.
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